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Systems concerned with information hiding often use randomization to obfuscate the link
between the observables and the information to be protected. The degree of protection
provided by a system can be expressed in terms of the probability of error associated
with the inference of the secret information. We consider a probabilistic process calculus
to specify such systems, and we study how the operators affect the probability of error.
In particular, we characterize constructs that have the property of not decreasing the
degree of protection, and that can therefore be considered safe in the modular
construction of these systems. As a case study, we apply these techniques to the Dining
Cryptographers, and we derive a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result.
1. Introduction
During the last decade, internet activities have become an important part of many peo-
ple’s lives. As the number of these activities increases, there is a growing amount of
personal information about the users that is stored in electronic form and that is usually
transferred using public electronic means. This makes it feasible and often easy to collect,
transfer and process a huge amount of information about a person. As a consequence,
the need for mechanisms to protect such information is compelling.
A recent example of such privacy concerns are the so-called “biometric” passports.
These passports, used by many countries and required by all visa waiver travelers to the
United States, include an RFID chip containing information about the passport’s owner.
These chips can be read wirelessly without any contact with the passport and without
the owner even knowing that his passport is being read. It is clear that such devices need
protection mechanisms to ensure that the contained information will not be revealed to
any non-authorized person.
In general, privacy can be defined as the ability of users to prevent information about
† This work has been partially supported by the project ANR-12-IS02-001 PACE, by the project ANR-
11-IS02-0002 LOCALI, by the INRIA Equipe Associe´e PRINCESS, by the INRIA Large Scale Initia-
tive CAPPRIS, and by EU grant agreement no. 295261 (MEALS). A preliminary version of this work
appeared in the proc. of FOSSACS 2008.
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themselves from becoming known to people other than those they choose to give the
information to. We can further categorize privacy properties based on the nature of the
hidden information. Data protection usually refers to confidential data like the credit card
number. Anonymity, on the other hand, concerns the identity of the user who performed
a certain action. Unlinkability refers to the link between the information and the user,
and unobservability regards the actions of a user.
Information-hiding protocols aim at ensuring a privacy property during an electronic
transaction. For example, the voting protocol Foo 92 (Fujioka, Okamoto & Ohta 1993)
allows a user to cast a vote without revealing the link between the voter and the vote. The
anonymity protocol Crowds (Reiter & Rubin 1998) allows a user to send a message on a
public network without revealing the identity of the sender. These kinds of protocols often
use randomization to introduce noise, thus limiting the inference power of a malicious
observer.
1.1. Information theory
At an abstract level information-hiding protocols can be viewed as information-theoretic
channels. A channel consists of a set of input values S, a set of output values O (the
observables) and a transition matrix which gives the conditional probability p(o|s) of
producing o as the output when s is the input. In the case of privacy preserving protocols,
S contains the secret information that we want to protect and O the facts that the
attacker can observe. This framework allows us to apply concepts from information theory
to reason about the knowledge that the attacker can gain about the input by observing
the output of the protocol (information leakage). This leakage is usually expressed in
terms of mutual information, that is the difference between the a priori entropy (the
initial uncertainty of the attacker) and the a posteriori entropy (the uncertainty of the
attacker after the observation). The channel capacity, that is defined as the maximum
mutual information under all possible a priori distributions, represents the worst case of
leakage.
1.2. Hypothesis testing
Information theory is parametric on the notion of entropy. The most popular one is Shan-
non entropy, because of its relation with the channel’s transmission rate. With respect to
the problem of information-hiding, however, one of the most natural notion is arguably
the Re´nyi min entropy (Re´nyi 1961). As discussed by Smith (Smith 2009), this notion
represents well the one-try attacks, and it is strictly related to the problem of hypothesis
testing and to the Bayes risk.
In information-hiding systems the attacker finds himself in the following scenario: he
cannot directly detect the information of interest, namely the actual value of the random
variable S ∈ S, but he can discover the value of another random variable O ∈ O which
depends on S according to a known conditional distribution. This kind of situation is
quite common also in other disciplines, like medicine, biology, and experimental physics,
to mention a few. The attempt to infer S from O is called hypothesis testing (the “hy-
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pothesis” to be validated is the actual value of S), and it has been widely investigated
in statistics.
One of the most used approaches to this problem is the Bayesian method, which con-
sists in assuming as known the a priori probability of the distribution of the hypotheses,
and in deriving from that (and from the matrix of the conditional probabilities) the a
posteriori distribution after a certain fact has been observed. It is well known that the
best strategy for the adversary is to apply the MAP (Maximum Aposteriori Probability)
criterion, which, as the name says, dictates that one should choose the hypothesis with
the maximum a posteriori probability for the given observation. “Best” means that this
strategy induces the smallest probability of error in the guess of the hypothesis. The
probability of error, in this case, is called Bayes risk. The a posteriori Re´nyi min entropy
is the logarithm of the converse of the Bayes risk†. In (Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi &
Panangaden 2008b), we proposed to define the degree of protection provided by a protocol
as the Bayes risk associated to the matrix. McIver et al. (McIver, Meinicke & Morgan
2010) have shown that the Bayes risk is the maximally discriminating among various
notions of entropy, when compositionality is taken into account.
A major problem with the Bayesian method is that the a priori distribution is not
always known. This is particularly true in security applications. In some cases, it may
be possible to approximate the a priori distribution by statistical inference, but in most
cases, especially when the input information changes over time, it may not. Thus other
methods need to be considered, which do not depend on the a priori distribution. One
such method is the one based on the so-called Maximum Likelihood criterion.
1.3. Contribution
In this paper we consider the Bayesian hypothesis-testing approach to the one-try attacks,
under the assumption that the input distribution is known. We consider as degree of
protection the Bayes risk, i.e. the probability of error of an adversary trying to discover
the secret using the MAP rule.
Next, we consider a probabilistic process algebra for the specification of information-
hiding protocols, and we investigate which constructs in the language can be used safely
in the sense that by applying them to a term, the degree of protection provided by the
term does not decrease. This provides a criterion to build specifications in a compositional
way, while preserving the degree of protection.
We apply these compositional methods to the example of the Dining Cryptographers,
and we are able to strengthen the strong anonymity result by Chaum. Namely we show
that we can have strong anonymity even if some coins are unfair, provided that there
is a spanning tree of fair ones. This result is obtained by adding processes representing
coins to the specification and using the fact that this can be done with a safe construct.
† There are other possible definitions of the a posteriori Re´nyi min entropy. Smith proposed to use this
one because of its suitability for the information-hiding problem.
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1.4. Plan of the paper
In the next section we recall some basic notions. Section 3 introduces the language CCSp.
Section 4 shows how to model protocols and process terms as channels. Section 5 discusses
hypothesis testing and presents some properties of the probability of error. Section 6
characterizes the constructs of CCSp which are safe. Section 7 applies previous results
to find a new property of the Dining Cryptographers. Section 8 discusses related work.
Section 9 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we give a brief overview of the technical concepts from the literature that
will be used through the paper. More precisely, we recall some basic notions of metric
spaces (see for instance (Munkres 2000)), probability theory (see for instance (Chung
2000)) and probabilistic automata (Segala 1995, Segala & Lynch 1995).
2.1. Metric spaces
A metric space is a pair (X, d) where X is a set and d : X ×X → [0,∞) is a function
(called distance or metric) which satisfies the following properties:
— for all x, y ∈ X, d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y,
— for all x, y ∈ X, d(x, y) = d(y, x),
— for all x, y, z ∈ X, d(x, y) ≤ d(y, z) + d(z, y).
Let (X, d) be a metric space. A sequence of elements in X is converging if it has a limit
in X with respect to the distance d. The metric space (X, d) is called compact if every
sequence of elements in X has a converging subsequence.
2.2. Probability spaces
Let Ω be a set. A σ-field over Ω is a collection F of subsets of Ω closed under complement
and countable union and such that Ω ∈ F . If B is a collection of subsets of Ω then the
σ-field generated by B is defined as the smallest σ-field containing U (its existence is
ensured by the fact that the intersection of an arbitrary set of σ-fields containing B is
still a σ-field containing B).
A measure on F is a function µ : F → [0,∞] such that
1 µ(∅) = 0 and
2 µ(
⋃
i Ci) =
∑
i µ(Ci) if {Ci}i is a countable collection of pairwise disjoint elements
of F .
A probability measure on F is a measure µ on F such that µ(Ω) = 1. A probability
space is a tuple (Ω,F , µ) where Ω is a set, called the sample space, F is a σ-field on Ω
and µ is a probability measure on F . The elements of a σ-field F are also called events.
We will denote by δ(x) (called the Dirac measure on x) the probability measure s.t.
δ(x)({y}) = 1 if y = x, and δ(x)({y}) = 0 otherwise. If {ci}i are convex coefficients,
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and {µi}i are probability measures, we will denote by
∑
i ciµi the probability measure
defined as (
∑
i ciµi)(A) =
∑
i ciµi(A).
If A,B are events then A ∩ B is also an event. If µ(A) > 0 then we can define the
conditional probability p(B|A), meaning “the probability of B given that A holds”, as
p(B|A) =
µ(A ∩B)
µ(A)
Note that p(·|A) is a new probability measure on F . In continuous probability spaces,
where many events have zero probability, it is possible to generalize the concept of condi-
tional probability to allow conditioning on such events. However, this is not necessary for
the needs of this paper. Thus we will use the above “traditional” definition of conditional
probability and make sure that we never condition on events of zero probability.
A probability space and the corresponding probability measure are called discrete if Ω
is countable and F = 2Ω. In this case, we can construct µ from a function p : Ω→ [0, 1]
satisfying
∑
x∈Ω p(x) = 1 by assigning µ({x}) = p(x). The set of all discrete probability
measures with sample space Ω will be denoted by Disc(Ω).
2.3. Probabilistic automata
A probabilistic automaton M is a tuple (St , Tinit ,Act , T ) where St is a set of states,
Tinit ∈ St is the initial state, Act is a set of actions and T ⊆ St × Act × Disc(St)
is a transition relation. Intuitively, if (T, a, µ) ∈ T then there is a transition from the
state T performing the action a and leading to a distribution µ over the states of the
automaton. (We use T for states instead of s because later in the paper states will be
(process) terms, and s will be used for sequences of actions.) We also write T
a
−→ µ
if (T, a, µ) ∈ T . The idea is that the choice of transition among the available ones in
T is performed nondeterministically, and the choice of the target state among the ones
allowed by µ (i.e., those states T ′ such that µ(T ′) > 0) is performed probabilistically. A
probabilistic automaton M is fully probabilistic if from each state of M there is at most
one transition available.
An execution fragment α of a probabilistic automaton is a (possibly infinite) sequence
T0a1T1a2T2 . . . of alternating states and actions, such that for each i there is a transition
(Ti, ai+1, µi) ∈ T and µi(Ti+1) > 0. We will use fst(α), lst(α) to denote the first and
last state of a finite execution fragment α respectively. An execution (or history) is an
execution fragment such that fst(α) = Tinit . An execution α is maximal if it is infinite or
there is no transition from lst(α) in T . We denote by exec∗(M), exec⊥(M), and exec(M)
the set of all the finite, all the non-maximal, and all executions of M, respectively.
A scheduler of a probabilistic automaton M = (St , Tinit ,Act , T ) is a function
ζ : exec⊥(M)→ T
such that ζ(α) = (T, a, µ) ∈ T implies that T = lst(α).
The idea is that a scheduler selects a transition among the ones available in T and it
can base his decision on the history of the execution. The execution tree of M relative
to the scheduler ζ, denoted by etree(M, ζ), is a fully probabilistic automaton M′ =
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(St ′, Tinit ,Act , T
′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec∗(M), and (α, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζ(α) =
(lst(α), a, µ) for some µ, and µ′(αaT ) = µ(T ). Intuitively, etree(M, ζ) is produced by
unfolding the executions of M and resolving the nondeterminism using ζ.
In the following, given two executions α, α′, we write α ≤ α′ to indicate that α is a
prefix of α′. Given a fully probabilistic automaton M = (St , Tinit ,Act , T ) we can define
a probability space (ΩM,FM, pM) on the space of executions of M as follows:
— ΩM ⊆ exec(M) is the set of maximal executions of M.
— If α is a finite execution ofM we define the cone with prefix α as Cα = {α
′ ∈ ΩM|α ≤
α′}. Let CM be the collection of all cones of M. Then F is the σ-field generated by
CM (by closing under complement and countable union).
— We define the probability of a cone Cα where α = T0a1T1 . . . anTn as
p(Cα) =
n∏
i=1
µi(Ti)
where µi is the (unique because the automaton is fully probabilistic) measure such
that (Ti−1, ai, µi) ∈ T . We define pM as the measure extending p to F (see (Segala
1995) for more details about this construction).
3. CCS with internal probabilistic choice
We consider an extension of standard CCS ((Milner 1989)) obtained by adding internal
probabilistic choice. The resulting calculus CCSp can be seen as a simplified version of the
probabilistic π-calculus presented in (Herescu & Palamidessi 2000, Palamidessi & Herescu
2005) and it is similar to the one considered in (Deng, Palamidessi & Pang 2005). Like
in those calculi, computations have both a probabilistic and a nondeterministic nature.
The main conceptual novelty is a distinction between observable and secret actions,
introduced for the purpose of specifying information-hiding protocols.
We assume a countable set Act of actions a, and we assume that it is partitioned into
a set Sec of secret actions s, a set Obs of observable actions o, and the silent action τ .
For each s ∈ Sec we assume a complementary action s ∈ Sec such that s = s, and the
same for Obs. The silent action τ does not have a complementary action, so the notation
a will imply that a ∈ Sec or a ∈ Obs.
The syntax of CCSp is the following:
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PROB
◦
∑
i pi Ti
τ
−→
∑
i pi δ(Ti)
ACT
j ∈ I
unionsqmultitext
Iai.Ti
aj
−→ δ(Tj)
PAR1
T1
a
−→ µ
T1 || T2
a
−→ µ || T2
PAR2
T2
a
−→ µ
T1 || T2
a
−→ T1 || µ
REP
T || !T
a
−→ µ
!T
a
−→ µ || !T
COM
T1
a
−→ δ(T ′
1
) T2
a
−→ δ(T ′
2
)
T1 || T2
τ
−→ δ(T ′
1
|| T ′
2
)
RES
T
b
−→ µ α 6= a, a
(νa)T
b
−→ (νa)µ
Table 1. The semantics of CCSp.
T ::= process term
◦
∑
i pi Ti probabilistic choice
|
unionsqmultitext
i si.Ti secret choice (si ∈ Sec)
|
unionsqmultitext
i ri.Ti nondeterministic choice (ri ∈ Obs ∪ {τ})
| T || T parallel composition
| (νa)T restriction
| !T replication
All the summations in the syntax are finite. We will use the notation T1 ⊕p T2 to
represent a binary probabilistic choice ◦
∑
i pi Ti with p1 = p and p2 = 1 − p. Similarly
we will use a1.T1
unionsqmultitext
a2.T2 to represent a binary secret or nondeterministic choice. For the
parallel operator we use the symbol “ || ” instead than the more standard “ | ” to avoid
confusion with the notation for conditional probability.
The semantics of a given CCSp term is a probabilistic automaton whose states are
process terms, whose initial state is the given term, and whose transitions T are those
derivable from the rules in Table 1. We recall that we use the notation T
a
−→ µ stands
for (T, a, µ) ∈ T . We denote by µ || T the measure µ′ such that µ′(T ′ || T ) = µ(T ′)
for all processes T ′ and µ′(T ′′) = 0 if T ′′ is not of the form T ′ || T , and similarly for
T || µ. Furthermore we denote by (νa)µ the measure µ′ such that µ′((νa)T ) = µ(T ), and
µ′(T ′) = 0 if T ′ is not of the form (νa)T .
Note that in the produced probabilistic automaton, all transitions to non-Dirac mea-
sures are silent. Note also that a probabilistic term generates exactly one (probabilistic)
transition.
A transition of the form T
a
−→ δ(T ′), i.e., a transition having for target a Dirac
measure, corresponds to a transition of a non-probabilistic automaton (a standard labeled
transition system). Thus, all the rules of CCSp specialize to the ones of CCS except
from PROB. The latter models the internal probabilistic choice: a silent τ transition is
available from the sum to a measure containing all of its operands, with the corresponding
probabilities.
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A secret choice
unionsqmultitext
i si.Ti produces the same transitions as the nondeterministic termunionsqmultitext
i ri.Ti, except for the labels.
The distinction between the two kind of labels influences the notion of scheduler for
CCSp: the secret actions are assumed to be inputs of the system. Namely we assume
that the process receives in input a sequence of secret actions, and a secret action in
the process can only be performed if it matches the next secret action in the input (this
match “consumes” the input). Hence some choices are determined, or influenced, by the
input. In particular, a secret choice with different guards is entirely decided by the input.
The scheduler has to resolve only the residual nondeterminism which derives from the
nondeterministic choices and from the interleavings.
In the following, we use the notation X ⇀ Y to represent the partial functions from
X to Y , and α|Sec represents the projection of α on Sec.
Definition 3.1. Let T be a process in CCSp and M be the probabilistic automaton
generated by T . A scheduler is a function
ζ : Sec∗ → exec∗(M)⇀ T
such that:
if (i) s = s1s2 . . . sn and α|Sec = s1s2 . . . sm with m ≤ n,
and (ii) there exists a transition (lst(α), a, µ) such that either a 6∈ Sec, or (a ∈ Sec and a = sm+1),
then ζ(s)(α) is defined, and it is one of the transitions that satisfy (ii).
We will write ζs(α) for ζ(s)(α).
Note that this definition of scheduler is different from the one used in probabilistic
automaton, where the scheduler can decide to stop, even if a transition is allowed. Here
the scheduler must proceed whenever a transition is allowed (provided that if it is labeled
by a secret, that secret is the next one in the input string s). This view is in line with
the standard operational semantics of CCS, where all enabled transitions are possible.
We now adapt the definition of execution tree from the notion found in probabilistic
automata. In our case, the execution tree depends not only on the scheduler, but also on
the input.
Definition 3.2. Let M = (St , T,Act , T ) be the probabilistic automaton generated by
a CCSp process T , where St is the set of processes reachable from T . Given an input
s and a scheduler ζ, the execution tree of T for s and ζ, denoted by etree(T, s, ζ), is
a fully probabilistic automaton M′ = (St ′, T,Act , T ′) such that St ′ ⊆ exec(M), and
(α, a, µ′) ∈ T ′ if and only if ζs(α) = (lst(α), a, µ) for some µ, and µ
′(αaT ) = µ(T ).
Note that we do not require the input s to be completely consumed during the execu-
tion. Typically, the execution consumes only the prefix of s which is to proceed at each
step in which a secret action is involved.
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4. Modeling protocols for information-hiding
In this section we propose an abstract model for information-hiding protocols, and we
show how to represent this model in CCSp. An extended example is presented in Section 7.
4.1. Protocols as channels
We view protocols as channels in the information-theoretic sense (Cover & Thomas
1991). The secret information that the protocol is trying to conceal constitutes the input
of the channel, and the observables constitute the outputs. The set of the possible inputs
and that of the possible outputs will be denoted by S and O respectively. We assume
that S and O are of finite cardinality m and n respectively. We also assume a discrete
probability distribution over the inputs, which we will denote by ~π = (π1, π2, . . . , πm),
where πi is the probability of the i-th element of S.
During the run, the protocol may use randomized operations to increase the level of
uncertainty about the secrets and obfuscate the link with the observables. It may also
have internal interactions between internal components, or other forms of nondetermin-
istic behavior, but let us rule out this possibility for the moment, and consider a purely
probabilistic protocol. We also assume there is exactly one output from each run of the
protocol, and again, this is not a restrictive assumption because the elements of O can
be structured data.
Given an input s, a run of the protocol will produce each o ∈ O with a certain
probability p(o|s) which depends on s and on the randomized operations performed
by the protocol. Note that p(o|s) depends only on the probability distributions on the
mechanisms of the protocol, and not on the input distribution. The probabilities p(o|s),
for s ∈ S and o ∈ O, constitute a m × n array M which is called the matrix of the
channel, where the rows are indexed by the elements of S and the columns are indexed
by the elements of O. We will use the notation (S,O,M) to represent the channel.
Note that the input distribution ~π and the probabilities p(o|s) determine a distribution
on the output. We will represent by p(o) the probability of o ∈ O. Thus both the input and
the output can be considered random variables. We will denote these random variables
by S and O.
If the protocol contains some form of nondeterminism, like internal components giving
rise to different interleaving and interactions, then the behavior of the protocol, and in
particular the output, will depend on the scheduling policy. We can reduce this case
to previous (purely probabilistic) scenario by assuming a scheduler ζ which resolves
the nondeterminism entirely. Of course, the conditional probabilities, and therefore the
matrix, will depend on ζ, too. We will express this dependency by using the notation
Mζ .
4.2. Process terms as channels
A given CCSp term T can be regarded as a protocol in which the input is constituted
by sequences of secret actions, and the output by sequences of observable actions. We
consider sequences as inputs instead than single actions, in order to be more general,
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and to account for the interactive nature of a process. Furthermore when the operational
semantics of a process calculus is expressed in terms of a labeled transition system (and
this is necessary in our context in order to achieve the compositionally results), it is
customary to use sequences of labels to represent the input/output behavior. On the
other hand, the standard notion of information-theoretic channel has only one input and
one output, hence we need to regard the whole sequence of secret actions as one secret
(the input of the channel), and analogously for the output.
We assume that only a finite set of finite sequences is relevant. This is certainly true
if the term is terminating, which is usually the case in security protocols, as each session
is supposed to terminate in finite time. For the sake of generality, we allow the element
of S (resp. O) to have different lengths. Thus S ⊆fin Sec
∗ and O ⊆fin Obs
∗.
Definition 4.1. Given a term T and a scheduler ζ : S → exec∗(M) → T , the matrix
Mζ(T ) associated with T under ζ is defined as the matrix such that, for each s ∈ S
and o ∈ O, p(o|s) is the probability of the set of the maximal executions in etree(T, s, ζ)
whose projection on Obs is o.
The following remark may be useful to understand the nature of the above definition:
Remark 4.2. Given a sequence s = s1s2 . . . sh, consider the term
T ′ = (νSec)(s¯1.s¯2. . . . .s¯h.0 || T )
Given a scheduler ζ for T , let ζ ′ be the scheduler on T ′ that chooses the transition
((νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 || U), r, (νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 || µ))
if ζs chooses (U, r, µ), with (r 6∈ Sec), and it chooses
((νSec)(s¯j .s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 || U), τ, (νSec)(δ(s¯j+1. . . . .s¯h.0 || (U
′)))
if ζs chooses (U, sj , δ(U
′)).
Note that ζ ′ is a “standard” scheduler, i.e., it does not depend on an input sequence.
We have that each element p(o|s) in Mζ(T ) is equal to the probability of the set of all
the maximal executions of T ′, under ζ ′, whose projection on Obs gives o.
5. Inferring the secrets from the observables
In this section we discuss possible methods by which an adversary can try to infer the
secrets from the observables, and consider the corresponding probability of error, that is,
the probability that the adversary draws the wrong conclusion. We regard the probability
of error as a representative of the degree of protection provided by the protocol, and we
study its properties with respect to the associated matrix.
We start by defining the notion of decision function, which represents the guess the
adversary makes about the secrets, for each observable. This is a well-known concept,
particularly in the field of hypothesis testing, where the purpose is to try to discover
the valid hypothesis from the observed facts, knowing the probabilistic relation between
the possible hypotheses and their consequences. In our scenario, the hypotheses are the
secrets.
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Definition 5.1. A decision function for a channel (S,O,M) is any function f : O → S.
Given a channel (S,O,M), an input distribution ~π, and a decision function f , the
probability of error P(f,M,~π) is the average probability of guessing the wrong hypothesis
by using f , weighted on the probability of the observable (see for instance (Cover &
Thomas 1991)). The probability that, given o, s is the wrong hypothesis is 1 − p(s|o)
(with a slight abuse of notation, we use p(·|·) to represent also the probability of the
input given the output). Hence we have:
Definition 5.2. (Cover & Thomas 1991) The probability of error with respect to a
decision function f is defined by
P(f,M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
p(o)p(f(o)|o)
Given a channel (S,O,M), the best decision function that the adversary can use,
namely the one that minimizes the probability of error, is the one associated with the
so-called MAP rule, which prescribes choosing the hypothesis s which has Maximum
Aposteriori Probability (for a given o ∈ O), namely the s for which p(s|o) is maximum.
The fact that the MAP rule represent the ‘best bet’ of the adversary is rather intuitive,
and well known in the literature. We refer to (Cover & Thomas 1991) for a formal proof.
The MAP rule is used in the so-called Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, and
the corresponding probability of error is also known as Bayes risk. We will denote it by
PMAP(M,~π). The following characterization is an immediate consequence of Definition 5.2
and of the Bayes theorem p(s|o) = p(o|s)πs/p(o).
PMAP(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
max
s
(p(o|s)πs)
It is natural then to define the degree of protection associated with a process term as
the infimum probability of error that we can obtain from this term under every compatible
scheduler (in a given class).
In the following, we assume the class of schedulers A to be the set of all the schedulers
compatible with the given input S.
It turns out that the infimum probability of error on A is achievable, i.e., it is actually
a minimum. In order to prove this fact, let us first define a suitable metric on A.
Definition 5.3. Consider a CCSp process T , and let M be the probabilistic automaton
generated by T . We define a distance d between schedulers in A as follows:
d(ζ, ζ ′) =


2−m if m = min{|α| | α ∈ exec∗(M) and ζ(α) 6= ζ ′(α)}
0 if ζ(α) = ζ ′(α) for all α ∈ exec∗(M)
where |α| represents the length of α.
Note that M is finitely branching, both in the nondeterministic and in the probabilistic
choices, in the sense that from every node T ′ there is only a finite number of transitions
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(T ′, a, µ) and µ is a finite summation of the form µ =
∑
i pi δ(Ti). Hence we have the
following (standard) result:
Proposition 5.4. (A, d) is a compact metric space, i.e., every sequence has a convergent
subsequence (namely a subsequence with a limit in A).
We are now ready to show that there exists a scheduler that gives the minimum
probability of error:
Proposition 5.5. For every CCSp process T we have that there exists a minimizing
ζm ∈ A such that
inf
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) = PMAP(Mζm(T ), ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
Proof. By Proposition 5.4, (A, d) is compact. Furthermore, PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) is a con-
tinuous function from (A, d) to ([0, 1], d′), where d′ is the standard distance on real
numbers. In fact, since S and O are finite sets of finite sequences, we have that for ev-
ery T there exists a δ such that d(ζ, ζ ′) < δ implies Mζ(T ) = Mζ′(T ). Consequently,
({PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π) | ζ ∈ A}, d
′) is also compact, and, since it represents a set of prob-
abilities, it is bounded, too. The rest follows from the fact that compact and bounded
subsets of reals are closed, and hence they contain their infima.
Thanks to previous proposition, we can define the degree of protection provided by a
protocols in terms of the minimum probability of error.
Definition 5.6. Given a CCSp process T , the protection PtMAP(T ) provided by T , in
the Bayesian approach, is given by
PtMAP(T, ~π) = min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T ), ~π)
We conclude this section with some properties of PMAP . The next proposition shows
that the probabilities of error are concave functions with respect to the space of matrices.
Proposition 5.7. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family {ci}i∈I
of convex coefficients, namely 0 ≤ ci ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I, and
∑
i∈I ci = 1. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I
ciMi, ~π) ≥
∑
i∈I
ci PMAP(Mi, ~π)
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Proof. Consider ∀i ∈ I,Mi = (pi(o|s))s∈S,o∈O. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i ciMi, ~π) = 1−
∑
omaxs(
∑
i ci pi(o|s)πs)
≥ 1−
∑
o
∑
i ci maxs(pi(o|s)πs)
= 1−
∑
i
∑
o ci maxs(pi(o|s)πs) (since the summands are positive)
= 1−
∑
i ci
∑
omaxs(pi(o|s)πs)
=
∑
i∈I ci −
∑
i∈I ci
∑
o∈Omaxs(pi(o|s)πs) (since
∑
i∈I ci = 1)
=
∑
i∈I ci(1−
∑
o∈Omaxs(pi(o|s)πs))
=
∑
i∈I ciPMAP(Mi, ~π)
Corollary 5.8. Consider a family of channels {(S,O,Mi)}i∈I , and a family {ci}i∈I of
convex coefficients. Then:
PMAP(
∑
i∈I
ciMi, ~π) ≥ min
i∈I
PMAP(Mi, ~π)
The next proposition shows that if we transform the observables, and collapse the
columns corresponding to observables which have become the same after the transfor-
mation, the probability of error does not decrease.
Proposition 5.9. Consider a channel (S,O,M), where M has conditional probabilities
p(o|s), and a transformation of the observables f : O → O′. Let M ′ be the matrix whose
conditional probabilities are p′(o′|s) =
∑
f(o)=o′ p(o|s) and consider the new channel
(S,O′,M ′). Then:
PMAP(M
′, ~π) ≥ PMAP(M,~π)
Proof. The result derives from:
∑
o′∈O′ maxs(p
′(o′|s)πs) =
∑
o′∈O′ maxs(
∑
f(o)=o′ p(o|s)πs)
≤
∑
o′∈O′
∑
f(o)=o′ maxs(p(o|s)πs)
=
∑
o∈Omaxs(p(o|s)πs)
The following propositions are from the literature.
Proposition 5.10. (Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi & Panangaden 2008a) Given
S, O, let M be a matrix indexed on S, O such that all the rows of M are equal, namely
p(o|s) = p(o|s′) for all o ∈ O, s, s′ ∈ S. Then,
PMAP(M,~π) = 1−max
s
πs
Furthermore PMAP(M,~π) is the maximum probability of error, i.e., for every other matrix
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M ′ indexed on S, O we have:
PMAP(M,~π) ≥ PMAP(M
′, ~π)
Proposition 5.11. (Bhargava & Palamidessi 2005) Given a channel (S,O,M), the
rows of M are equal (and hence the probability of error is maximum) if and only if
p(s|o) = πs for all s ∈ S, o ∈ O.
The condition p(s|o) = πs means that the observation does not give any additional
information concerning the hypothesis. In other words, the a posteriori probability of s
coincides with its a priori probability. The property p(s|o) = πs for all s ∈ S and o ∈ O
was used as a definition of (strong) anonymity by Chaum (Chaum 1988) and was called
conditional anonymity by Halpern and O’Neill (Halpern & O’Neill 2005).
6. Safe constructs
In this section we investigate constructs of the language CCSp which are safe with respect
to the protection of the secrets.
We start by giving some conditions that will allow us to ensure the safety of the parallel
and the restriction operators.
Definition 6.1. Consider process term T , and the observables o1, o2, . . . , ok such that
(i) T does not contain any secret action, and
(ii) the observable actions of T are included in o1, o2, . . . , ok.
Then we say that T is safe outside o1, o2, . . . , ok.
The following theorem states our main results for PtMAP . Note that they are also valid
for PtML, because PtML(T ) = PtMAP(T, ~πu). In the following, given a function f : X → R
for which an element xm exists such that f(xm) = minx∈X f(x), we will denote such xm
by minargx∈X f(x) or alternatively by minargX f(x).
Theorem 6.2. The probabilistic choice, the nondeterministic choice, and a restricted
form of parallel composition are safe constructs, namely, for every input probability π,
and any terms T1, T2, . . . , Th, we have
(1) PtMAP( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti, ~π) ≥
∑
i
pi PtMAP(Ti, ~π) ≥ min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(2) PtMAP(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti, ~π) = min
i
PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
(3) PtMAP((ν o1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)) ≥ PtMAP(T2, ~π)
if T1 is safe outside o1, o2, . . . , ok.
Proof.
1 By definition PtMAP( ◦
∑
i pi Ti, ~π) = minζ∈A PMAP(Mζ( ◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π).
Let ζm = minargA PMAP(Mζ( ◦
∑
i pi Ti), ~π). Hence
PtMAP( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti, ~π) = PMAP(Mζm( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti), ~π)
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Consider, for each i, the scheduler ζmi defined as ζm on the i-th branch, except for
the removal of the first state and the first τ -step from the execution fragments in the
domain. It’s easy to see that
Mζm( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti) =
∑
i
piMζmi(Ti)
From Proposition 5.7 we derive
PMAP(Mζm( ⊙
∑
i
pi Ti), ~π) ≥
∑
i
piPMAP(Mζmi(Ti), ~π)
Finally, observe that ζmi is still compatible with S, hence we have
PMAP(Mζmi(Ti), ~π) ≥ PtMAP(Ti, ~π) for all i
which concludes the proof in this case.
2 Let ζm = minargA PMAP(Mζ(
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti), ~π). Let Ai be the class of schedulers that choose
the i-th branch at the beginning of the execution, and define
ζni = minarg
Ai
PMAP(Mζ(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti), ~π)
Obviously we have
PtMAP(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti, ~π) = min
i
PMAP(Mζni(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti), ~π)
Consider now, for each i, the scheduler ζmi defined as as ζni, except for the removal
of the first state and the first step from the execution fragments in the domain.
Obviously ζmi is still compatible with S, and the observables of Ti are i one-to one
correspondence with those of
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti via the bijective function fi(oioj1 . . . ojk) =
oj1 . . . ojk . Furthermore, all the probabilities of the channel Mζni(
unionsqmultitext
i oi.Ti) are the
same as those of Mζmi(Ti) modulo the renaming of o into f(o). Hence we have
PMAP(Mζni(
unionsqmultidisplay
i
oi.Ti), ~π) = PMAP(Mζmi(Ti), ~π) = PtMAP(Ti, ~π)
which concludes the proof of this case.
3 Let ζm = minargA PMAP(Mζ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π). Hence
PtMAP((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2), ~π) = PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
The proof proceeds by constructing a set of series of schedulers whose limit with
respect to the metric d in Definition 5.3 correspond to schedulers on the execution
tree of T2. Consider a generic node in the execution tree of (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)
under ζm, and let (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || T
′
2) be the new term in that node. Assume
α to be the execution history up to that node. Let us consider separately the three
possible kinds of transitions derivable from the operational semantics:
(a) (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || T
′
2)
a
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (µ || T
′
2) due to a transition T
′
1
a
−→
µ. In this case a must be τ because of the assumption that T1 does not contain
secret actions and all its observable actions are included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}. Assume
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that µ =
∑
i pi δ(T
′
1i). Then we have
(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (µ || T
′
2) =
∑
i
pi δ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i || T
′
2)).
Let us now consider the tree obtained by replacing the above distribution by
δ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i || T
′
2)) (i.e., the tree obtained by pruning all alternatives
except (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i || T
′
2), and assigning to it probability 1). Let ζmi be the
projection of ζm on the new tree (i.e., ζmi is defined as the projection of ζm on the
histories α′ such that if α is a proper prefix of α′ then ατ(νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1i || T
′
2)
is a prefix of α′). We have
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
=
PMAP(
∑
i pi Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥ (by Proposition 5.7)
∑
i pi PMAP(Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
In the execution tree of T2 the above transition does not have a correspondent, but
it obliges us to consider all different schedulers that are associated to the various
ζmi’s for different i’s.
(b) (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || T
′
2)
a
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || µ) due to a transition T
′
2
a
−→
µ, with a not included in {o1, o2, . . . , ok}. In this case, the corresponding scheduler
for T2 must choose the same transition, i.e., T
′
2
a
−→ µ.
(c) (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || T
′
2)
τ
−→ (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) δ(T
′′
1 || T
′′
2 ) due to the transitions
T ′1
a
−→ δ(T ′′1 ) and T
′
2
a¯
−→ δ(T ′′2 ). In this case a must be an observable o because
of the assumption that T1 does not contain secret actions. The corresponding
scheduler for T2 must choose the transition T
′
2
a¯
−→ δ(T ′′2 ).
By considering the inequalities given by the transitions of type (a), we obtain se-
quences of schedulers of the form {ζm, ζmi, ζmij , ζmijh, . . .}, which behave like ζm until
the node (νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T
′
1 || T
′
2), and correspond to paths of increasing depth in
the subtree of that node. Let pi, qj , rh . . . the probabilities of the branches selected
by ζmi, ζmij , ζmijh, . . . at each next choice point (which corresponds to a choice point
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with the same probability in the execution of T2). We have:
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥
∑
i pi PMAP(Mζmi((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥
∑
i pi
∑
j qj PMAP(Mζmij ((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥
∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh PMAP(Mζmijh((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥
. . .
Observe now that for every i, j, h, . . . {ζm, ζmi, ζmij , ζmijh, . . .} is a converging series
of schedulers whose limit ζmijh... is isomorphic to a scheduler for T2, except that
some of the observable transitions in T2 may be removed due to the restriction on
o1, o2, . . . , ok. This removal determines a (usually non injective) mapping f on the
observables. Hence Proposition 5.9 applies, and we have:
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥
∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .PMAP(Mζmijh...((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π)
≥ (by Proposition 5.9)
∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .PMAP(Mζmijh...(T2), ~π)
≥
∑
i pi
∑
j qj
∑
h rh . . .minζ∈A PMAP(Mζ(T2), ~π)
Finally, observe that
∑
i pi =
∑
j qj =
∑
h rh = . . . = 1, hence
PMAP(Mζm((νo1, o2, . . . , ok) (T1 || T2)), ~π) ≥ min
ζ∈A
PMAP(Mζ(T2), ~π)
which concludes the proof.
Unfortunately the safety property does not hold for the secret choice. The following is
a counterexample.
Example 6.3. Let Sec = {s1, s2} and assume that S does not contain the empty se-
quence. Let T = o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0. For all sequences s, s
′ ∈ S we have p(o1|s) = p(o1|s
′)
and p(o2|s) = p(o1|s
′). Hence, by Proposition 5.10 we have PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1 − maxs πs.
K. Chatzikokolakis, C. Palamidessi and C. Braun 18
Consider now T ′ = s1.T
unionsqmultitext
s2.T . Let us define a scheduler that, if the secret starts
with s1 selects o1, and if the secret starts with s2 selects o2. We note that, under
this scheduler, p(o1|s1s) = p(o2|s2s) = 1 while p(o1|s2s) = p(o2|s1s) = 0. Therefore
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) = 1 − p1 − p2 where p1 and p2 are the maximum probabilities of the
secrets of the form s1s and s2s, respectively. Note now that either maxs πs = p1 or
maxs πs = p2 because of the assumption that S does not contain the empty sequence.
Let ~π be such that both p1 and p2 are positive. Then 1 − p1 − p2 < 1 −maxs πs, hence
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) < PtMAP(T, ~π).
The reason why we need the condition (i) in Definition 6.1 for the parallel operator is
analogous to the case of secret choice. The following is a counterexample.
Example 6.4. Let Sec and S be as in Example 6.3. Define T1 = s1.0
unionsqmultitext
s2.0 and
T2 = o1.0
unionsqmultitext
o2.0. Again, we have PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1 − maxs πs. Consider now the term
T1 || T2 and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T1 and then, if s is s1,
it selects o1, while if s is s2, it selects o2. The rest proceeds like in Example 6.3, where
T ′ = T1 || T2 and T = T2.
The reason why we need the condition (ii) in Definition 6.1 is that without it the
parallel operator may create different interleavings, thus increasing the possibility of an
adversary discovering the secrets. The following is a counterexample.
Example 6.5. Let Sec and S be as in Example 6.3. Define T1 = o.0 and T2 =
s1.(o1.0 ⊕.5 o2.0)
unionsqmultitext
s2.(o1.0 ⊕.5 o2.0). It is easy to see that PtMAP(T2, ~π) = 1−maxs πs.
Consider the term T1 || T2 and define a scheduler that first executes an action s in T2
and then, if s is s1, it selects first T1 and then the continuation of T2, while if s is s2, it
selects first the continuation of T2 and then T1. Hence, under this scheduler, p(oo1|s1s) =
p(oo2|s1s) = .5 and also p(o1o|s2s) = p(o2o|s2s) = .5 while p(oo1|s2s) = p(oo2|s2s) = 0
and p(o1o|s1s) = p(o2o|s1s) = 0. Therefore PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−p1−p2 where p1 and p2 are
the maximum probabilities of the secrets of the form s1s and s2s, respectively. Following
the same reasoning as in Example 6.3, we have that PtMAP(T
′, ~π) < PtMAP(T, ~π).
7. A case study: the Dining Cryptographers
In this section we consider the Dining Cryptographers (DC) protocol proposed by Chaum
(Chaum 1988), we show how to describe it in CCSp, and we apply the results of the
previous section to obtain a generalization of Chaum’s strong anonymity result.
In its most general formulation, the DC consists of a multigraph where one of the nodes
(cryptographers) may be secretly designated to pay for the dinner. The cryptographers
would like to find out whether there is a payer or not, but without either discovering the
identity of the payer, nor revealing it to an external observer. The problem can be solved
as follows: we put on each edge a probabilistic coin, with two possible, mutually exclusive
results, 0 or 1. The coins are tossed, and each cryptographer computes the binary sum
of all (the results of) the adjacent coins. Furthermore, it adds 1 if it is designated to be
the payer. Finally, all the cryptographers declare their result.
It is easy to see that this protocol solves the problem of figuring out the existence of a
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Crypti = ci,i1 (x1) . . . . . ci,ik (xk) . payi(x) . d¯i〈x1 + . . .+ xk + x〉
Coinh = c¯ℓ,h〈0〉 . c¯r,h〈0〉.0 ⊕ph c¯ℓ,h〈1〉 . c¯r,h〈1〉.0
Collect = d1(y1) . d2(y2) . . . . . dn(yn) . out〈y1, y2, . . . , yn〉
DC = (ν~c)(ν ~d)(
∏
i Crypti ||
∏
h Coinh || Collect)
Table 2. The dining cryptographers protocol expressed in CCSp.
payer: the binary sum of all declarations is 1 if and only if there is a payer, because all
the coins are counted twice, so their contribution to the total sum is 0.
The property we are interested in, however, is the anonymity of the system. Chaum
proved that the DC is strongly anonymous if all the coins are fair, i.e., they give 0 and 1
with equal probability, and the multigraph is connected, namely there is a path between
each pair of nodes. To state formally the property, let us denote by s the secret identity
of the payer, and by o the collection of the declarations of the cryptographers.
Theorem 7.1. (Chaum 1988) If the multigraph is connected, and the coins are fair,
then DC is strongly anonymous, namely for every s and o, p(s|o) = p(s) holds.
We are now going to show how to express the DC in CCSp. We start by introducing
a notation for value-passing in CCSp, following standard lines. The new notation is just
syntactic sugar, in the sense that it is expressed in terms of the constructs of CCSp.
Input c(x).T =
unionsqmultidisplay
v
cv.T [v/x]
Output c¯〈v〉 = c¯v
The protocol, represented in Table 2, is defined as the parallel composition of the
cryptographers processes Crypt i, of the coin processes Coinh, and of a process Collect
whose purpose is to collect all the declarations of the cryptographers, and output them
in the form of a tuple. The reason for using this process Collect is that in the original
Chaum protocol all cryptographers are supposed to make their declaration at the same
time. This is important because otherwise the schedule could reveal the identity of the
payer by scheduling his declaration first, for example. However in CCSp concurrency is
resolved by interleaving, and it is not possible to enforce the simultaneity of a set of
actions (with he exception of a pair of complementary actions in a synchronisation step).
Hence we need to simulate the simultaneous declarations by means of a single process
(Collect) that collects the results into a tuple and then declares the tuple in a single
step, and by internalizing the interleavings corresponding to the possible orders in which
the results are transmitted by the cryptographers to Collect. Since these interleavings
are internalized (i.e. they do not produce any observable action), their order does not
matter: they are all equivalent (namely, invisible) from the point of view of the observer.
In this protocol, the secret actions are pay i. All the others are observable actions.
Each coin communicates with two cryptographers. ci,h represents the communication
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channel between Coinh and Crypt i if h is indeed the index of a coin, otherwise it repre-
sents a communication channel “with the environment”. We will call the latter external.
In the original definition of the DC there are no external channels, we have added them
to prove a generalization of Chaum’s result. They could be interpreted as a way for
the environment to influence the computation of the cryptographers and hence test the
system, for the purpose of discovering the secret.
We are now ready to state our generalization of Chaum’s result:
Theorem 7.2. A DC is strongly anonymous if it has a spanning tree consisting of fair
coins only.
Proof. Consider the term DC in Table 2. Remove all the coins that do not belong
to the spanning tree, and the corresponding restriction operators. Let T be the process
term obtained this way. Let A be the class of schedulers which select the value 0 for all
the external channels. Since all the remaining coins are fair, this situation corresponds
to the original formulation of Chaum and so we can apply Chaum’s result (Theorem 7.1)
and Proposition 5.11 to conclude that all the rows of the matrix M are the same and
hence, by Proposition 5.10, PMAP(M,~π) = 1−maxi πi.
Consider now one of the removed coins, h, and assume, without loss of generality, that
cℓ,h(x), cr,h(x) are the first actions in the definitions of Cryptℓ and Cryptr. Consider
the class of schedulers B that selects value 1 for x in these channels. The matrix M ′
that we obtain is isomorphic to M : the only difference is that each column o is now
mapped to a column o + w, where w is a tuple that has 1 in the ℓ and r positions,
and 0 in all other positions, and + represents the componentwise binary sum. Since
this map is a bijection, we can apply Proposition 5.9 in both directions and derive that
PMAP(M
′, ~π) = 1−maxi πi.
By repeating the same reasoning on each of the removed coins, we can conclude that
PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−maxi πi for any scheduler ζ of T .
Consider now the term T ′ obtained from T by adding back the coin h:
T ′ = (νcℓ,hcr,h)(Coinh || T )
By applying Theorem 6.2 we can deduce that
PtMAP(T
′, ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π)
By repeating this reasoning, we can add back all the coins, one by one, and obtain the
original DC . Hence we can conclude that
PtMAP(DC , ~π) ≥ PtMAP(T, ~π) = 1−max
i
πi
and, since 1−maxi πi is the maximum probability of error,
PtMAP(DC , ~π) = 1−max
i
πi
which concludes the proof.
Interestingly, also the other direction of Theorem 7.2 holds. We report this result for
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completeness, however we have proved it by using traditional methods, not by applying
the compositional methods of Section 6.
Theorem 7.3. A DC is strongly anonymous only if it has a spanning tree consisting of
fair coins only.
Proof. By contradiction. Let G be the multigraph associated to the DC and let n be
the number of vertices in G. Assume that G does not have a spanning tree consisting
only of fair coins. Then it is possible to split G in two non-empty subgraphs, G1 and G2,
such that all the edges between G1 and G2 are unfair. Let (c1, c2, . . . , cm) be the vector
of coins corresponding to these edges. Since G is connected, we have that m ≥ 1.
Let a1 be a vertex in G1 and a2 be a vertex in G2. By our assumption of strong
anonymity, for every observable o (which, we recall, is a vector of bits representing the
declarations of the cryptographers) we have
p(o | a1) = p(o | a2) (1)
Here a1, resp. a2, represents the event that the cryptographer a1, resp. a2, is the payer.
Observe now that, if w is a binary vector of dimension n containing 1 exactly twice,
in correspondence of a1 and a2, then p(o | a1) = p(o+w | a2), where o+w is the vector
resulting from the component wise binary sum of o and w. This is because by adding
1 to their declarations, we invert the payer/non payer behavior of a1 and a2. Thus by
adding w to the declarations in the case in which a2 is the payer (and a1 is a non-payer)
we obtain the same result as the case in which a1 is the payer (and a2 is a non-payer).
Hence (1) becomes
p(o+ w | a2) = p(o | a2) (2)
Let d be the binary sum of all the elements of o in G1, and d
′ be the binary sum of all
the elements of o+ w in G1. Since in G1 w contains 1 exactly once, we have d
′ = d+ 1.
Hence (2), being valid for all o’s, implies
p(d+ 1 | a2) = p(d | a2) (3)
Because of the way o, and hence d, are calculated, and since the contribution of the edges
internal to G1 is 0, and a2 (the payer) is not in G1, we have that
d =
m∑
i=1
ci
from which, together with (3), and the fact that the coins are independent from the
choice of the payer, we derive
p(
m∑
i=1
ci = 0) = p(
m∑
i=1
ci = 1) = 1/2 (4)
The last step is to prove that p(
∑m
i=1 ci = 0) = 1/2 implies that one of the ci’s is
fair, which will give us a contradiction. We prove this by induction on m. The prop-
erty obviously holds for m = 1. Let us now assume that we have proved it for the
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vector (c1, c2, . . . , cm−1). Observe that p(
∑m
i=1 ci = 0) = p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 0)p(cm = 0) +
p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 1)p(cm = 1). From (4) we derive
p(
m−1∑
i=1
ci = 0)p(cm = 0) + p(
m−1∑
i=1
ci = 1)p(cm = 1) = 1/2 (5)
Now, it is easy to see that (5) has only two solutions: one in which p(cm = 0) = 1/2, and
one in which p(
∑m−1
i=1 ci = 1) = 1/2. In the first case we are done, in the second case we
apply the induction hypothesis.
8. Related work
In the field of information flow there have been various works (McLean 1990, James W.
Gray III 1991, Lowe 2002, Clark, Hunt & Malacaria 2001, Clark, Hunt & Malacaria 2005,
Malacaria 2007, Malacaria & Chen 2008, Heusser & Malacaria 2009, Smith 2009, Andre´s,
Palamidessi, van Rossum & Smith 2010a, Alvim, Andre´s & Palamidessi 2010, Boreale,
Pampaloni & Paolini 2011) in which the high information and the low information are
seen as the input and output respectively of a (noisy) channel. Information leakage is
formalized in this setting as the channel mutual information or the channel capacity. The
idea is that the leakage represents the difference between the a priori uncertainty about
the (secret) high information, and the a posteriori uncertainty, after the low information
has become pubblically known. The uncertainty is expressed in terms of entropy, and
there are various alternative notions depending on the notion of attack that one wishes
to model, as discussed in (Ko¨pf & Basin 2007). Most of the above approaches are based
either on Shannon entropy or on the Re´nyi min entropy.
Channel capacity has been also used in relation to anonymity in (Moskowitz, Newman,
Crepeau & Miller 2003b, Moskowitz, Newman & Syverson 2003a). These works propose
a method to create covert communication by means of non-perfect anonymity.
A related line of work is (Serjantov & Danezis 2002, Dı´az, Seys, Claessens & Preneel
2002), where the main idea is to express the lack of (probabilistic) information in terms
of entropy.
A different information-theoretic approach is taken in (Clarkson, Myers & Schneider
2009). In this paper, the authors define information leakage as the difference between
the a priori accuracy of the guess of the attacker, and the a posteriori one, after the
attacker has made his observation. The accuracy of the guess is defined as the Kullback-
Leibler distance between the belief (which is a weight attributed by the attacker to each
input hypothesis) and the true distribution on the hypotheses. This approach, that was
Shannon-based in (Clarkson et al. 2009), was later applied by Hamadou et al. (Hamadou,
Palamidessi & Sassone 2010) also to the case of the Re´nyi min entropy.
The problem of preservation of information protection under program composition was
considered also by McIver et al (McIver et al. 2010). In that paper, the author define
an order  on specifications based on Bayes Risk, and they identify a compositional
subset of it: a refinement order ⊑ such that S ⊑ I implies C[S]  C[I] for all contexts
C. They also show that ⊑ is the compositional closure of , in the sense that S 6⊑ I
only when C[S] 6 C[I] for some C. Finally, they prove that ⊑ is sound for other three,
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competing notions of elementary test and that therefore Bayes-Risk testing, with context,
is maximally discriminating among them.
Desharnais et al. (Desharnais, Jagadeesan, Gupta & Panangaden 2002) defined a no-
tion of metric between probabilistic processes and proved that the Shannon capacity
associated to a protocol associated to a process is continuous with respect to this metric.
Deng et al. (Deng, Pang & Wu 2006) consider a probabilistic calculus similar to CCSp,
and define a relation between traces based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence. They show
that certain constructs of their calculus preserve the relation, in the sense that they do
not increase the divergence.
The analysis of quantitative information flow in concurrent programs has also been
investigated in purely probabilistic (i.e. non information-theoretic) frameworks. For in-
stance, (Garcia, van Rossum & Sokolova 2007) proposed to verify strong probabilistic
anonymity by checking the sufficient condition that if two states differ only for the choice
of the secret value, then the probabilistic automata rooted in those two states are isomor-
phic. This idea was further developed by (Andre´s, Palamidessi, van Rossum & Sokolova
2010b).
9. Conclusion, discussion, and future work
In this paper we have proposed to use the notion of Bayes risk to measure the degree of
protection offered by an information-hiding protocol. We have investigated CCSpconstructs
that are safe, i.e., that are guaranteed not to decrease the protection. Then we have ap-
plied these results to strengthen a result of Chaum: the dining cryptographers are strongly
anonymous if and only if they have a spanning tree of fair coins.
We recall that the Bayes risk represents the probability of error of an adversary who
knows the exact prior probability distribution, and therefore he applies the MAP rule
exactly. In case the adversary does not know the exact prior, he can still apply (an
approximation of) the MAP rule of course, using for instance the uniform distribution,
or his best bet, as the prior. Since the MAP rule is optimal, the probability of error
in the approximate case is always greater than or equal to the Bayes risk. Hence the
compositional method developed in this paper is still useful to compute a lower bound
on the degree of protection.
One natural question is whether we could obtain a better (more precise) bound in
the case we know for sure that the adversary is going to use a certain distribution as
prior. Typically, if the adversary does not know anything about the prior distribution,
he will use the uniform prior. This is equivalent to applying the so-called ML rule, which
prescribes the choice of the s which has Maximum Likelihood (for a given o ∈ O), namely
the s for which p(o|s) is maximum‡ The corresponding probability of error PML(M,~π) can
be characterised as follows (as an immediate consequence of Definition 5.2 and od the
Bayes theorem).
‡ The name comes from the fact that p(o|s) is called the likelihood of s given o.
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PML(M,~π) = 1−
∑
O
p(o|so)πso
where p(o|so) = maxs(p(o|s)).
However, the methods developed in this paper cannot be applied to compute a better
lower bound for PML(M,~π), because Proposition 5.9, which is crucial for the compo-
sitionally results, does not hold for PML(M,~π). We leave the problem of developing a
compositional method for computing the risk of ML-based attacks as a topic for future
work.
Another problem that we would like to investigate in the future is the extension our
results to other constructs of the language, and in particular to a more liberal type of
parallel composition. This is not possible in the present setting, as the examples after
Theorem 6.2 show. The problem is related to the scheduler: the standard notion of
scheduler is too powerful and can leak secrets, by depending on the secret choices that
have been made in the past. All the examples after Theorem 6.2 are based on this kind
of problem. In (Chatzikokolakis & Palamidessi 2010), we have studied the problem and
we came out with a language-based solution to restrict the power of the scheduler. We
are planning to investigate whether such approach could be exploited here to guarantee
the safety of more constructs.
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